TY - GEN
T1 - A case study on implementing false data injection attacks against nonlinear state estimation
AU - Konstantinou, Charalambos
AU - Maniatakos, Michail
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2016 ACM.
PY - 2016/10/28
Y1 - 2016/10/28
N2 - Smart grid aims to improve control and monitoring routines to ensure reliable and efficient supply of electricity. The rapid advancements in information and communication technologies of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks, however, have resulted in complex cyber physical systems. This added complexity has broadened the attack surface of power-related applications, amplifying their susceptibility to cyber threats. A particular class of system integrity attacks against the smart grid is False Data Injection (FDI). In a successful FDI attack, an adversary compromises the readings of grid sensors in such a way that errors introduced into estimates of state variables remain undetected. This paper presents an end-to-end case study of how to instantiate real FDI attacks to the Alternating Current (AC) -nonlinear- State Estimation (SE) process. The attack is realized through firmware modifications of the microprocessor-based remote terminal systems, falsifying the data transmitted to the SE routine, and proceeds regardless of perfect or imperfect knowledge of the current system state. The case study concludes with an investigation of an attack on the IEEE 14 bus system using load data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO).
AB - Smart grid aims to improve control and monitoring routines to ensure reliable and efficient supply of electricity. The rapid advancements in information and communication technologies of Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) networks, however, have resulted in complex cyber physical systems. This added complexity has broadened the attack surface of power-related applications, amplifying their susceptibility to cyber threats. A particular class of system integrity attacks against the smart grid is False Data Injection (FDI). In a successful FDI attack, an adversary compromises the readings of grid sensors in such a way that errors introduced into estimates of state variables remain undetected. This paper presents an end-to-end case study of how to instantiate real FDI attacks to the Alternating Current (AC) -nonlinear- State Estimation (SE) process. The attack is realized through firmware modifications of the microprocessor-based remote terminal systems, falsifying the data transmitted to the SE routine, and proceeds regardless of perfect or imperfect knowledge of the current system state. The case study concludes with an investigation of an attack on the IEEE 14 bus system using load data from the New York Independent System Operator (NYISO).
KW - Cyber security
KW - False data injection
KW - Firmware
KW - Flash memory
KW - Reverse engineering
KW - Smart grid
KW - State estimation
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85001785510&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85001785510&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2994487.2994491
DO - 10.1145/2994487.2994491
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85001785510
T3 - CPS-SPC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, co-located with CCS 2016
SP - 81
EP - 91
BT - CPS-SPC 2016 - Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, co-located with CCS 2016
PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc
T2 - 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and PrivaCy, CPS-SPC 2016
Y2 - 28 October 2016
ER -