A Characterization of Sub-game Perfect Equilibria for SDEs of Mean-Field Type

Boualem Djehiche, Minyi Huang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We study a class of dynamic decision problems of mean-field type with time-inconsistent cost functionals and derive a stochastic maximum principle to characterize sub-game perfect equilibrium points. Subsequently, this approach is extended to a mean-field game to construct decentralized strategies and obtain an estimate of their performance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)55-81
Number of pages27
JournalDynamic Games and Applications
Volume6
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2016

Keywords

  • Equilibrium
  • Maximum principle
  • Mean-field game
  • Mean-field SDE
  • Time-inconsistent stochastic control

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computational Mathematics
  • Applied Mathematics

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