A consistent bargaining set

Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray, Kunal Sengupta, Rajiv Vohra

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    Both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency. In excluding imputations to which there exist objections, the core does not assess the "credibility" of such objections. The bargaining set goes a step further. Only objections which have no counterobjections are considered justified. However, the credibility of counterobjections is not similarly assessed. We formulate a notion of a consistent bargaining set in which each objection in a "chain" of objections is tested in precisely the same way as its predecessor. Various properties of the consistent bargaining set are also analyzed.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)93-112
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume49
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Oct 1989

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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