A consistent bargaining set

Bhaskar Dutta; Debraj Ray; Kunal Sengupta; Rajiv Vohra

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0

A consistent bargaining set

Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray, Kunal Sengupta, Rajiv Vohra

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Both the core and the bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency. In excluding imputations to which there exist objections, the core does not assess the "credibility" of such objections. The bargaining set goes a step further. Only objections which have no counterobjections are considered justified. However, the credibility of counterobjections is not similarly assessed. We formulate a notion of a consistent bargaining set in which each objection in a "chain" of objections is tested in precisely the same way as its predecessor. Various properties of the consistent bargaining set are also analyzed.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	93-112
Number of pages	20
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	49
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0
State	Published - Oct 1989

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0

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author = "Bhaskar Dutta and Debraj Ray and Kunal Sengupta and Rajiv Vohra",

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A consistent bargaining set

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