A defense of intuitions

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Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists' challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)247-262
Number of pages16
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number2
StatePublished - Aug 2008


  • Empirical psychology
  • Experimental philosophy
  • Experimentalism
  • Intuitionism
  • Intuitions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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