A dynamic Bayesian security game framework for strategic defense mechanism design

Sadegh Farhang, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Milad Nasr Esfahani, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In many security problems, service providers are basically unaware of the type of their clients. The client can potentially be an attacker who will launch an attack at any time during their connections to service providers. Our main goal is to provide a general framework for modeling security problems subject to different types of clients connected to service providers. We develop an incomplete information two-player game, to capture the interaction between the service provider (i.e., the server) and an unknown client. In particular, we consider two types of clients, i.e., attacker and benign clients. We analyze the game using perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) with different conditions. We finally design an algorithm using the computed PBNE strategy profiles to find the best defense strategy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and GameTheory for Security - 5th International Conference, GameSec 2014, Proceedings
EditorsRadha Poovendran, Walid Saad
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages319-328
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9783319126005
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Event5th International Conference on Decision and GameTheory for Security, GameSec 2014 - Los Angeles, United States
Duration: Nov 6 2014Nov 7 2014

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume8840
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other5th International Conference on Decision and GameTheory for Security, GameSec 2014
CountryUnited States
CityLos Angeles
Period11/6/1411/7/14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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