TY - JOUR
T1 - A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money
AU - Coles, Melvyn G.
AU - Wright, Randall
N1 - Funding Information:
* We thank many of our friends and colleagues and participants in seminars and conferences (too many to mention by name) as well as the associate editor for helpful suggestions and comments. We also thank The National Science Foundation and La Comision Interministerial de Ciencia y Tecnologia for financial support. The usual disclaimer applies.
PY - 1998/1
Y1 - 1998/1
N2 - This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching, strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78, D83, E31.
AB - This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching, strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C78, D83, E31.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0002318314&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0002318314&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2353
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2353
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0002318314
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 78
SP - 32
EP - 54
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -