TY - JOUR
T1 - A dynamic game analysis and design of infrastructure network protection and recovery
AU - Chen, Juntao
AU - Touati, Corinne
AU - Zhu, Quanyan
N1 - Funding Information:
This research is partially supported by a DHS grant through Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute (CIRI), grants CNS-1544782 and SES-1541164 from National Science of Foundation (NSF), and grant DE-NE0008571 from the Department of Energy (DOE).
Publisher Copyright:
Copyright is held by author/owner(s).
PY - 2017/9/1
Y1 - 2017/9/1
N2 - Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
AB - Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
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U2 - 10.1145/3152042.3152079
DO - 10.1145/3152042.3152079
M3 - Conference article
AN - SCOPUS:85041378203
SN - 0163-5999
VL - 45
SP - 125
EP - 128
JO - Performance Evaluation Review
JF - Performance Evaluation Review
IS - 2
T2 - Workshop on MAthematical Performance Modeling and Analysis, MAMA 2017, 2017 Greenmetrics Workshop and Workshop on Critical Infrastructure Network Security, CINS 2017
Y2 - 1 June 2017
ER -