A Dynamic Game Approach to Strategic Design of Secure and Resilient Infrastructure Network

Juntao Chen, Corinne Touati, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. We further investigate the resilience planning of the defender and the strategic timing of attack of the adversary. Finally, we use case studies of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number8742568
Pages (from-to)462-474
Number of pages13
JournalIEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Volume15
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2020

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Recovery
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)
Disasters
Telecommunication networks
Costs
Planning

Keywords

  • Dynamic games
  • infrastructure networks
  • resilience
  • security
  • subgame perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

A Dynamic Game Approach to Strategic Design of Secure and Resilient Infrastructure Network. / Chen, Juntao; Touati, Corinne; Zhu, Quanyan.

In: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, Vol. 15, 8742568, 01.01.2020, p. 462-474.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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