A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications

Sintayehu Dehnie; Nasir Memon

doi:10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376

A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications

Sintayehu Dehnie, Nasir Memon

Center for Cyber Security

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Cooperative wireless communication protocols are designed with the assumption that users always behave in a socially efficient manner. This assumption may not be valid in commercial wireless networks where users may violate rules of cooperation to reap benefits of cooperation at no cost. Disobeying the rules of cooperation creates a social-dilemma where well-behaved users exhibit uncertainty about intention of other users. Cooperation in social-dilemma is characterized by a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium which indicates the difficulty of maintaining a socially optimal cooperation without establishing a mechanism to detect and mitigates effects of misbehavior. In this paper, we formulate interaction of users in cooperative Amplify-and-Forward as a dynamic game with incomplete information. We show the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009
Pages	3485-3488
Number of pages	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376
State	Published - 2009
Event	2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009 - Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China Duration: Apr 19 2009 → Apr 24 2009

Publication series

Name	ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings
ISSN (Print)	1520-6149

Other

Other	2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009
Country/Territory	Taiwan, Province of China
City	Taipei
Period	4/19/09 → 4/24/09

Keywords

Ad hoc network
Communication system security
Cooperative diversity
Game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Signal Processing
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376

Cite this

Dehnie, S., & Memon, N. (2009). A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. In 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009 (pp. 3485-3488). Article 4960376 (ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings). https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376

A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. / Dehnie, Sintayehu; Memon, Nasir.
2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009. 2009. p. 3485-3488 4960376 (ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Dehnie, S & Memon, N 2009, A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications. in 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing - Proceedings, ICASSP 2009., 4960376, ICASSP, IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing - Proceedings, pp. 3485-3488, 2009 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, ICASSP 2009, Taipei, Taiwan, Province of China, 4/19/09. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICASSP.2009.4960376

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A dynamic game model for amplify-and-forward cooperative communications

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Keywords

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