A game theory analysis of dual discrimination

Janet Dukerich; Keith Weigelt; Andrew Schotter

doi:10.1016/0749-5978(90)90045-B

A game theory analysis of dual discrimination

Janet Dukerich, Keith Weigelt, Andrew Schotter

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A series of experiments with undergraduate management students was conducted to examine the behavioral effects of situations with dual discrimination in an incentive compensation scheme. Subjects were randomly assigned to a disadvantaged or advantaged status and simultaneously were discriminated for or against, in a two-person tournament. A game theoretic model was used to predict the choices subjects in the two conditions of dual discrimination would make if they attempted to maximize monetary outcomes. Results indicated that while the theory of tournaments was capable of predicting the pattern of results, subjects tended to expend more effort than predicted. The implications of these results for the theory and for public policy are discussed.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	21-41
Number of pages	21
Journal	Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Volume	47
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0749-5978(90)90045-B
State	Published - Oct 1990

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Applied Psychology
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

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title = "A game theory analysis of dual discrimination",

abstract = "A series of experiments with undergraduate management students was conducted to examine the behavioral effects of situations with dual discrimination in an incentive compensation scheme. Subjects were randomly assigned to a disadvantaged or advantaged status and simultaneously were discriminated for or against, in a two-person tournament. A game theoretic model was used to predict the choices subjects in the two conditions of dual discrimination would make if they attempted to maximize monetary outcomes. Results indicated that while the theory of tournaments was capable of predicting the pattern of results, subjects tended to expend more effort than predicted. The implications of these results for the theory and for public policy are discussed.",

author = "Janet Dukerich and Keith Weigelt and Andrew Schotter",

note = "Funding Information: Address reprint requests to Janet Dukerich at Department of Management, CBA 4.202 University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712 {\textquoteright} This research was funded by the C. V. Starr Center. 21 Copyright: Copyright 2014 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

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A game theory analysis of dual discrimination

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