A Golden-Free Approach to Detect Trojans in COTS Multi-PCB Systems

Animesh Basak Chowdhury; Anushree Mahapatra; Yang Liu; Prashanth Krishnamurthy; Farshad Khorrami; Ramesh Karri

doi:10.1109/MM.2023.3300713

A Golden-Free Approach to Detect Trojans in COTS Multi-PCB Systems

Animesh Basak Chowdhury, Anushree Mahapatra, Yang Liu, Prashanth Krishnamurthy, Farshad Khorrami, Ramesh Karri

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Untrusted third parties in commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) printed circuit board (PCB) supply chains may poison PCBs with hardware, firmware, and software implants. Hence, we focus on detection of malicious implants in PCBs. State-of-the-art hardware Trojan detection methods require a golden PCB system/model to detect malicious implants and do not scale to large-scale COTS PCB systems. We map a COTS PCB system to a graph and propose a golden-free methodology comprising a graph-based mathematical construction on node and edge equivalences, and clustering of identical nodes and paths and validation of hypothesized statistical properties on measured sidechannel data. We evaluate the methodology on a multi-PCB testbed with hierarchically networked PCB devices and several types of Trojans.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	64-76
Number of pages	13
Journal	IEEE Micro
Volume	43
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/MM.2023.3300713
State	Published - Sep 1 2023

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Hardware and Architecture
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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10.1109/MM.2023.3300713

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abstract = "Untrusted third parties in commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) printed circuit board (PCB) supply chains may poison PCBs with hardware, firmware, and software implants. Hence, we focus on detection of malicious implants in PCBs. State-of-the-art hardware Trojan detection methods require a golden PCB system/model to detect malicious implants and do not scale to large-scale COTS PCB systems. We map a COTS PCB system to a graph and propose a golden-free methodology comprising a graph-based mathematical construction on node and edge equivalences, and clustering of identical nodes and paths and validation of hypothesized statistical properties on measured sidechannel data. We evaluate the methodology on a multi-PCB testbed with hierarchically networked PCB devices and several types of Trojans.",

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AU - Khorrami, Farshad

AU - Karri, Ramesh

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A Golden-Free Approach to Detect Trojans in COTS Multi-PCB Systems

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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