A group majority voting model of public good provision

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

A model of public good provision by majority rule selection incorporating the behavior of rational group voting is formulated. Two probability maximizing candidates are assumed. If voters are risk averse in public sector preferences, then a unique symmetric (both candidates offering identical platforms) equilibrium exists. If certain additional conditions hold on the group cost functions of political support, this equilibrium will lie at the public good levels which maximizes the sum of voter utility. It is further demonstrated that it is unlikely for those conditions to be satisfied and therefore more realistic asymmetric equilibria with positive voter turnout is predicted.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)117-131
Number of pages15
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume4
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1987

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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