A laboratory investigation of multiperson rationality and presentation effects

Andrew Schotter, Keith Weigelt, Charles Wilson

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects were presented with different two-person decision problems in both their extensive and normal forms. All games generated the same equilibrium outcomes. Our results indicate that the presentation of the decision problem significantly affects the strategy chosen. Surprisingly, these presentation effects were most prominent in the simplest games where differences in presentation would seem most transparent. It appears that subjects are much more likely to use (and fear) incredible threats when the problem is presented as a one-stage rather than as a multistage game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 026, 215.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)445-468
    Number of pages24
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - May 1994

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics


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