A Lagrangian approach to constrained potential games: Theory and examples

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper, we use a Lagrangian approach to solve for Nash equilibrium in a continuous non-cooperative game with coupled constraints. We discuss the necessary and the sufficient conditions to characterize the equilibrium of the constrained games. In addition, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. We focus on the class of potential games and point out a relation between potential games and centralized optimization. Based on these results, we illustrate the Lagrangian approach with symmetric quadratic games and briefly discuss the notion of game duality. In addition, we discuss two engineering potential game examples from network rate control and wireless power control, for which the Lagrangian approach simplifies the solution process.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 47th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2008
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2420-2425
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781424431243
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Event47th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2008 - Cancun, Mexico
Duration: Dec 9 2008Dec 11 2008

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370

Other

Other47th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2008
Country/TerritoryMexico
CityCancun
Period12/9/0812/11/08

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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