A mean-field stackelberg game approach for obfuscation adoption in empirical risk minimization

Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Data ecosystems are becoming larger and more complex, while privacy concerns are threatening to Erode their potential benefits. Recently, users have developed obfuscation techniques that issue fake search engine queries, undermine location tracking algorithms, or evade government surveillance. These techniques raise one conflict between each user and the machine learning algorithms which track the users, and one conflict between the users themselves. We use game theory to capture the first conflict with a Stackelberg game and the second conflict with a mean field game. Both are combined into a bi-level framework which quantifies accuracy using empirical risk minimization and privacy using differential privacy. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which 1) each user is incentivized to obfuscate if other users are obfuscating, 2) the tracking algorithm can avoid this by promising a level of privacy protection, and 3) this promise is incentive-compatible for the tracking algorithm.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2017 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2017 - Proceedings
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages518-522
Number of pages5
ISBN (Electronic)9781509059904
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 7 2018
Event5th IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2017 - Montreal, Canada
Duration: Nov 14 2017Nov 16 2017

Publication series

Name2017 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2017 - Proceedings
Volume2018-January

Other

Other5th IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2017
CountryCanada
CityMontreal
Period11/14/1711/16/17

Keywords

  • Differential Privacy
  • Empirical Risk Minimization
  • Mean-Field Game
  • Obfuscation
  • Stackelberg Game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Information Systems
  • Signal Processing

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  • Cite this

    Pawlick, J., & Zhu, Q. (2018). A mean-field stackelberg game approach for obfuscation adoption in empirical risk minimization. In 2017 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2017 - Proceedings (pp. 518-522). (2017 IEEE Global Conference on Signal and Information Processing, GlobalSIP 2017 - Proceedings; Vol. 2018-January). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/GlobalSIP.2017.8308697