A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties

Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, M. Remzi Sanver

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    We propose in this chapter a procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral treaties that produces a compromise as close as possible to the preferences of all parties. By "close" we mean that the maximum distance of the compromise from the position of any state is minimal, which we call a minimax outcome. We show that this procedure is relatively invulnerable to strategizing by states, reducing any incentive they might have to misrepresent their preferences to try to induce a better outcome.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationDiplomacy Games
    Subtitle of host publicationFormal Models and International Negotiations
    PublisherSpringer Berlin Heidelberg
    Pages265-282
    Number of pages18
    ISBN (Print)9783540683032
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 2007

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Arts and Humanities(all)

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