A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties

Steven J. Brams; D. Marc Kilgour; M. Remzi Sanver

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14

A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties

Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, M. Remzi Sanver

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

We propose in this chapter a procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral treaties that produces a compromise as close as possible to the preferences of all parties. By "close" we mean that the maximum distance of the compromise from the position of any state is minimal, which we call a minimax outcome. We show that this procedure is relatively invulnerable to strategizing by states, reducing any incentive they might have to misrepresent their preferences to try to induce a better outcome.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Diplomacy Games
Subtitle of host publication	Formal Models and International Negotiations
Publisher	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Pages	265-282
Number of pages	18
ISBN (Print)	9783540683032
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14
State	Published - 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Social Sciences
General Arts and Humanities

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14

Cite this

@inbook{7a258f1a49534522bf25422f34539edd,

title = "A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties",

abstract = "We propose in this chapter a procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral treaties that produces a compromise as close as possible to the preferences of all parties. By {"}close{"} we mean that the maximum distance of the compromise from the position of any state is minimal, which we call a minimax outcome. We show that this procedure is relatively invulnerable to strategizing by states, reducing any incentive they might have to misrepresent their preferences to try to induce a better outcome.",

author = "Brams, {Steven J.} and Kilgour, {D. Marc} and Sanver, {M. Remzi}",

year = "2007",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "9783540683032",

pages = "265--282",

booktitle = "Diplomacy Games",

publisher = "Springer Berlin Heidelberg",

}

TY - CHAP

T1 - A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties

AU - Brams, Steven J.

AU - Kilgour, D. Marc

AU - Sanver, M. Remzi

PY - 2007

Y1 - 2007

N2 - We propose in this chapter a procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral treaties that produces a compromise as close as possible to the preferences of all parties. By "close" we mean that the maximum distance of the compromise from the position of any state is minimal, which we call a minimax outcome. We show that this procedure is relatively invulnerable to strategizing by states, reducing any incentive they might have to misrepresent their preferences to try to induce a better outcome.

AB - We propose in this chapter a procedure for reaching agreement on multilateral treaties that produces a compromise as close as possible to the preferences of all parties. By "close" we mean that the maximum distance of the compromise from the position of any state is minimal, which we call a minimax outcome. We show that this procedure is relatively invulnerable to strategizing by states, reducing any incentive they might have to misrepresent their preferences to try to induce a better outcome.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=58149507494&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=58149507494&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14

DO - 10.1007/978-3-540-68304-9_14

M3 - Chapter

AN - SCOPUS:58149507494

SN - 9783540683032

SP - 265

EP - 282

BT - Diplomacy Games

PB - Springer Berlin Heidelberg

ER -

A Minimax procedure for negotiating multilateral treaties

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this