A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents

Jacob Glazer; Ariel Rubinstein

doi:10.1086/669160

A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents

Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1057-1082
Number of pages	26
Journal	Journal of Political Economy
Volume	120
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1086/669160
State	Published - Dec 2012

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1086/669160

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A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents

Abstract

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