A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents

Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1057-1082
    Number of pages26
    JournalJournal of Political Economy
    Volume120
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 2012

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this