TY - GEN
T1 - A New Paradigm in Split Manufacturing
T2 - 22nd Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019
AU - Sengupta, Abhrajit
AU - Nabeel, Mohammed
AU - Knechtel, Johann
AU - Sinanoglu, Ozgur
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 EDAA.
PY - 2019/5/14
Y1 - 2019/5/14
N2 - Split manufacturing was introduced as an effective countermeasure against hardware-level threats such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of hardware Trojans. Nevertheless, the security promise of split manufacturing has been challenged by various attacks, which exploit the well-known working principles of physical design tools to infer the missing BEOL interconnects. In this work, we advocate a new paradigm to enhance the security for split manufacturing. Based on Kerckhoff's principle, we protect the FEOL layout in a formal and secure manner, by embedding keys. These keys are purposefully implemented and routed through the BEOL in such a way that they become indecipherable to the state-of-the-art FEOL-centric attacks. We provide our secure physical design flow to the community. We also define the security of split manufacturing formally and provide the associated proofs. At the same time, our technique is competitive with current schemes in terms of layout overhead, especially for practical, large-scale designs (ITC'99 benchmarks).
AB - Split manufacturing was introduced as an effective countermeasure against hardware-level threats such as IP piracy, overbuilding, and insertion of hardware Trojans. Nevertheless, the security promise of split manufacturing has been challenged by various attacks, which exploit the well-known working principles of physical design tools to infer the missing BEOL interconnects. In this work, we advocate a new paradigm to enhance the security for split manufacturing. Based on Kerckhoff's principle, we protect the FEOL layout in a formal and secure manner, by embedding keys. These keys are purposefully implemented and routed through the BEOL in such a way that they become indecipherable to the state-of-the-art FEOL-centric attacks. We provide our secure physical design flow to the community. We also define the security of split manufacturing formally and provide the associated proofs. At the same time, our technique is competitive with current schemes in terms of layout overhead, especially for practical, large-scale designs (ITC'99 benchmarks).
KW - ATPG
KW - Split manufacturing
KW - proximity attack
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85066602506&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85066602506&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.23919/DATE.2019.8715281
DO - 10.23919/DATE.2019.8715281
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85066602506
T3 - Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019
SP - 414
EP - 419
BT - Proceedings of the 2019 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2019
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Y2 - 25 March 2019 through 29 March 2019
ER -