TY - JOUR
T1 - A political economy model of congressional careers
AU - Diermeier, Daniel
AU - Keane, Michael
AU - Merlo, Antonio
PY - 2005/3
Y1 - 2005/3
N2 - Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in Congress.
AB - Our main goal is to quantify the returns to a career in the United States Congress. We specify a dynamic model of career decisions of a member of Congress and estimate this model using a newly collected dataset. Given estimates of the structural model, we assess reelection probabilities, estimate the effect of congressional experience on private and public sector wages, and quantify the value of a congressional seat. Moreover, we assess how an increase in the congressional wage or the imposition of term limits would affect the career decisions of politicians and the returns from a career in Congress.
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U2 - 10.1257/0002828053828464
DO - 10.1257/0002828053828464
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:20444367353
SN - 0002-8282
VL - 95
SP - 347
EP - 373
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
IS - 1
ER -