A PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH NO ADVANTAGE TO COMMITMENT

R. Vohra; F. Espinosa; D. Ray

A PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH NO ADVANTAGE TO COMMITMENT

R. Vohra, F. Espinosa, D. Ray

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit to a menu of contracts in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1043-1054
Number of pages	12
Journal	Pure and Applied Functional Analysis
Volume	6
Issue number	5
State	Published - 2021

Keywords

Commitment
Envelope theorem
Optimization
Principal agent model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Analysis
Applied Mathematics
Control and Optimization

Cite this

@article{5ab3d0210fc54925a08da893e2b57647,

title = "A PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH NO ADVANTAGE TO COMMITMENT",

abstract = "This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit to a menu of contracts in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal{\textquoteright}s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.",

keywords = "Commitment, Envelope theorem, Optimization, Principal agent model",

author = "R. Vohra and F. Espinosa and D. Ray",

year = "2021",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "6",

pages = "1043--1054",

journal = "Pure and Applied Functional Analysis",

issn = "2189-3756",

publisher = "Yokohama Publications",

number = "5",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH NO ADVANTAGE TO COMMITMENT

AU - Vohra, R.

AU - Espinosa, F.

AU - Ray, D.

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit to a menu of contracts in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.

AB - This paper explores conditions under which the ability to commit to a menu of contracts in a principal-agent relationship creates no additional benefit for the principal, over and above simultaneous interaction without commitment. A central assumption is that the principal’s payoff depends only on the payoff to the agent and her type.

KW - Commitment

KW - Envelope theorem

KW - Optimization

KW - Principal agent model

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85163385409&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85163385409&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:85163385409

SN - 2189-3756

VL - 6

SP - 1043

EP - 1054

JO - Pure and Applied Functional Analysis

JF - Pure and Applied Functional Analysis

IS - 5

ER -

A PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP WITH NO ADVANTAGE TO COMMITMENT

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this