A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper

Melda Yuksel; Xi Liu; Elza Erkip

doi:10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper

Melda Yuksel, Xi Liu, Elza Erkip

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009
Pages	110-114
Number of pages	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368
State	Published - Dec 7 2009
Event	2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009 - Taormina, Sicily, Italy Duration: Oct 11 2009 → Oct 16 2009

Publication series

Name	2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009

Other

Other	2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009
Country/Territory	Italy
City	Taormina, Sicily
Period	10/11/09 → 10/16/09

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computational Theory and Mathematics
Computer Networks and Communications
Information Systems
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

Cite this

@inproceedings{e869f44c5b1540b2aea1a499a30a8134,

title = "A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper",

abstract = "In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.",

author = "Melda Yuksel and Xi Liu and Elza Erkip",

year = "2009",

month = dec,

day = "7",

doi = "10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "9781424449835",

series = "2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009",

pages = "110--114",

booktitle = "2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009",

note = "2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009 ; Conference date: 11-10-2009 Through 16-10-2009",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper

AU - Yuksel, Melda

AU - Liu, Xi

AU - Erkip, Elza

PY - 2009/12/7

Y1 - 2009/12/7

N2 - In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.

AB - In this work a four terminal Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper and a jammer relay is studied. The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission. It assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase the achievable secrecy rates. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay, this problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum continuous game, where the payoff is the achieved secrecy rate. For this game the Nash Equilibrium is generally achieved with mixed strategies. The optimal cumulative distribution functions for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the equilibrium secrecy rate, are found.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=76249124606&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=76249124606&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

DO - 10.1109/ITW.2009.5351368

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:76249124606

SN - 9781424449835

T3 - 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009

SP - 110

EP - 114

BT - 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009

T2 - 2009 IEEE Information Theory Workshop, ITW 2009

Y2 - 11 October 2009 through 16 October 2009

ER -

A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper

Abstract

Publication series

Other

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this