TY - JOUR
T1 - A secure communication game with a relay helping the eavesdropper
AU - Yuksel, Melda
AU - Liu, Xi
AU - Erkip, Elza
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received September 15, 2010; revised January 20, 2011; accepted February 26, 2011. Date of publication March 10, 2011; date of current version August 17, 2011. This work is based upon work supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant 0635177 and in part by the New York State Center for Advanced Technology in Telecommunications (CATT). This paper was presented in part at the IEEE Information Theory Workshop, Taormina, Italy, October 2009, and in part at the 21st Annual IEEE International Symposium on Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, Istanbul, Turkey, September 2010. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. João Barros.
PY - 2011/9
Y1 - 2011/9
N2 - In this work, a four-terminal complex Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper, and a jammer relay is studied under two different set of assumptions: 1) The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission, and 2) The jammer relay is causally given the source message. In both cases, the jammer relay assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase it. To help the eavesdropper, the jammer relay can use pure relaying and/or send interference. Each of the problems is formulated as a two-player, noncooperative, zero-sum continuous game. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay in the first problem, the Nash equilibrium is found and shown to be achieved with mixed strategies in general. The optimal cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the Nash equilibrium secrecy rate, are found. For the second problem, the Nash equilibrium solution is found and the results are compared to the case when the jammer relay is not informed about the source message.
AB - In this work, a four-terminal complex Gaussian network composed of a source, a destination, an eavesdropper, and a jammer relay is studied under two different set of assumptions: 1) The jammer relay does not hear the source transmission, and 2) The jammer relay is causally given the source message. In both cases, the jammer relay assists the eavesdropper and aims to decrease the achievable secrecy rates. The source, on the other hand, aims to increase it. To help the eavesdropper, the jammer relay can use pure relaying and/or send interference. Each of the problems is formulated as a two-player, noncooperative, zero-sum continuous game. Assuming Gaussian strategies at the source and the jammer relay in the first problem, the Nash equilibrium is found and shown to be achieved with mixed strategies in general. The optimal cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) for the source and the jammer relay that achieve the value of the game, which is the Nash equilibrium secrecy rate, are found. For the second problem, the Nash equilibrium solution is found and the results are compared to the case when the jammer relay is not informed about the source message.
KW - Eavesdropping
KW - jamming
KW - physical layer security
KW - relay channel
KW - wire-tap channel
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U2 - 10.1109/TIFS.2011.2125956
DO - 10.1109/TIFS.2011.2125956
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:80051713767
SN - 1556-6013
VL - 6
SP - 818
EP - 830
JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IS - 3 PART 1
M1 - 5729364
ER -