TY - JOUR
T1 - A signaling theory of congressional oversight
AU - Cameron, Charles M.
AU - Rosendorff, B. Peter
PY - 1993/1
Y1 - 1993/1
N2 - A take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with asymmetric information and costly signaling is used to examine Congressional supervision (“oversight”) of federal agencies. Hearings signal the resoluteness of the committee-the likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to draft and pass a bill overruling an agency. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist: a pooling equilibrium, and a set of partial-pooling equilibria in which the receiver is able to distinguish among groups of senders. When the receiver sends its utility-maximizing offer, the sender vetoes with positive probability, and if a compromise offer is sent, it is sent on the assurance of its acceptance. These results resemble patterns in oversight observed in Congress. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.
AB - A take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with asymmetric information and costly signaling is used to examine Congressional supervision (“oversight”) of federal agencies. Hearings signal the resoluteness of the committee-the likelihood that the committee will expend the effort to draft and pass a bill overruling an agency. Two kinds of sequential equilibria exist: a pooling equilibrium, and a set of partial-pooling equilibria in which the receiver is able to distinguish among groups of senders. When the receiver sends its utility-maximizing offer, the sender vetoes with positive probability, and if a compromise offer is sent, it is sent on the assurance of its acceptance. These results resemble patterns in oversight observed in Congress. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 025, 026.
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U2 - 10.1006/game.1993.1003
DO - 10.1006/game.1993.1003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0038363016
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 5
SP - 44
EP - 70
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 1
ER -