Abstract
This note provides a characterization of Approval Voting as the only ballot aggregation function satisfying faithfulness, consistency, and cancellation. The proof is simpler than those of the characterizations of Fishburn (Aggregation and revelation of preferences, 1978a; J Econ Theory 19:180-185, 1978b), and also shows that the assumption of Neutrality used there was unnecessary.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 621-625 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Dec 2006 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics