A structural model of government formation

Daniel Diermeier; Hülya Eraslan; Antonio Merlo

doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00389

A structural model of government formation

Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	27-70
Number of pages	44
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	71
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00389
State	Published - 2003

Keywords

Bargaining
Coalitions
Comparative constitutional design
Government dissolution
Government formation
Political stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/1468-0262.00389

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title = "A structural model of government formation",

abstract = "In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.",

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KW - Coalitions

KW - Comparative constitutional design

KW - Government dissolution

KW - Government formation

KW - Political stability

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A structural model of government formation

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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