A structural model of government formation

Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments aimed at evaluating the impact of institutional features of the political environment on the duration of the government formation process, the type of coalitions that form, and their relative stability.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)27-70
    Number of pages44
    Issue number1
    StatePublished - 2003


    • Bargaining
    • Coalitions
    • Comparative constitutional design
    • Government dissolution
    • Government formation
    • Political stability

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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