Abstract
If we believe that politics involves a significant amount of strategic interaction then classical statistical tests, such as Ordinary Least Squares, Probit or Logit, cannot give us the right answers. This is true for two reasons: the dependent variables under observation are interdependent - that is, the essence of game theoretic logic - and the data is censored - that is, an inherent feature of off the path expectations that leads to selection effects. I explore the consequences of strategic decision-making on empirical estimation in the context of international crisis escalation. Having shown how and why classical estimation techniques fail in strategic settings, I develop a method that ameliorates these problems.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 698-701 |
Number of pages | 4 |
Journal | American Journal of Political Science |
Volume | 42 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Apr 1998 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations