TY - GEN
T1 - Account Security Interfaces
T2 - 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
AU - Daffalla, Alaa
AU - Bohuk, Marina
AU - Dell, Nicola
AU - Bellini, Rosanna
AU - Ristenpart, Thomas
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© USENIX Security 2023. All rights reserved.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Online services increasingly rely on user-facing interfaces to communicate important security-related account information—for example, which devices are logged into a user’s account and when recent logins occurred. These are used to assess the security status of an account, which is particularly critical for at-risk users likely to be under active attack. To date, however, there has been no investigation into whether these interfaces work well. We begin to fill this gap by partnering with a clinic that supports survivors of intimate partner violence (IPV). We investigated hundreds of transcripts to identify ones capturing interactions between clinic consultants and survivors seeking to infer the security status of survivor accounts, and we performed a qualitative analysis of 28 transcripts involving 19 consultants and 22 survivors. Our findings confirm the importance of these interfaces for assessing a user’s security, but we also find that these interfaces suffer from a number of limitations that cause confusion and reduce their utility. We go on to experimentally investigate the lack of integrity of information contained in device lists and session activity logs for four major services. For all the services investigated, we show how an attacker can either hide accesses entirely or spoof access details to hide illicit logins from victims.
AB - Online services increasingly rely on user-facing interfaces to communicate important security-related account information—for example, which devices are logged into a user’s account and when recent logins occurred. These are used to assess the security status of an account, which is particularly critical for at-risk users likely to be under active attack. To date, however, there has been no investigation into whether these interfaces work well. We begin to fill this gap by partnering with a clinic that supports survivors of intimate partner violence (IPV). We investigated hundreds of transcripts to identify ones capturing interactions between clinic consultants and survivors seeking to infer the security status of survivor accounts, and we performed a qualitative analysis of 28 transcripts involving 19 consultants and 22 survivors. Our findings confirm the importance of these interfaces for assessing a user’s security, but we also find that these interfaces suffer from a number of limitations that cause confusion and reduce their utility. We go on to experimentally investigate the lack of integrity of information contained in device lists and session activity logs for four major services. For all the services investigated, we show how an attacker can either hide accesses entirely or spoof access details to hide illicit logins from victims.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85176141941&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85176141941&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85176141941
T3 - 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
SP - 3601
EP - 3618
BT - 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX Security 2023
PB - USENIX Association
Y2 - 9 August 2023 through 11 August 2023
ER -