Achieving Social Optimum in Dynamic Weight Adaptation for Virus Mitigation: A Potential Differential Game Approach

Yunhan Huang, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Contribution to journalConference article

Abstract

In this paper, a differential game framework is proposed to provide a theoretic underpinning for decentralized mitigation of virus spreading in which each node determines its own control control policy based on local information. To reduce the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium and allow the decentralized policy to achieve social welfare, we propose a mechanism through a penalty scheme for a class of potential differential games over networks. The differential game under the penalty scheme turns out to be a potential differential game. To investigate the long term behaviors of the weight adaptation scheme, we study their turnpike properties. Numerical experiments are used to corroborate the results and demonstrate how the weight adapts to mitigate virus spreading and turnpike properties of the potential differential game.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)241-246
Number of pages6
JournalIFAC-PapersOnLine
Volume52
Issue number20
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019
Event8th IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems, NECSYS 2019 - Chicago, United States
Duration: Sep 16 2019Sep 17 2019

Keywords

  • Differential Game
  • Epidemics
  • Mechanism Design
  • Potential Game
  • Turnpike Property

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering

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