TY - JOUR
T1 - Addiction from the harmful dysfunction perspective
T2 - How there can be a mental disorder in a normal brain
AU - Wakefield, Jerome C.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2020/7/1
Y1 - 2020/7/1
N2 - Is addiction a medical disorder, and if so, what kind of disorder is it? Addiction is considered a brain disease by NIDA, based on observed brain changes in addicts that are interpreted as brain damage. Critics argue that the brain changes result instead from normal neuroplasticity and learning in response to the intense rewards provided by addictive substances, thus addiction is not a disorder but rather a series of normal-range if problematic choices. Relying on the harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder to evaluate disorder versus nondisorder status, I argue that even if one accepts the critics’ reinterpretation of NIDA's brain evidence and rejects the brain disease account, the critics’ conclusion that addiction is not a medical disorder but is rather a matter of problematic nondisordered choice does not follow. This is because there is a further possible account of addiction, the evolutionary “hijack” view, that holds that addiction is due to the availability of substances and stimuli that were unavailable during human species evolution and that coopt certain brain areas concerned with human motivation, creating biologically undesigned peremptory desires. I argue that if the hijack theory is correct, then it opens up the possibility that addiction could be a true motivational medical disorder for which there is no underlying neurological-level dysfunction. Finally, I explore the implications of this account for how we see the social responsibility for addiction and how we attempt to control it.
AB - Is addiction a medical disorder, and if so, what kind of disorder is it? Addiction is considered a brain disease by NIDA, based on observed brain changes in addicts that are interpreted as brain damage. Critics argue that the brain changes result instead from normal neuroplasticity and learning in response to the intense rewards provided by addictive substances, thus addiction is not a disorder but rather a series of normal-range if problematic choices. Relying on the harmful dysfunction analysis of medical disorder to evaluate disorder versus nondisorder status, I argue that even if one accepts the critics’ reinterpretation of NIDA's brain evidence and rejects the brain disease account, the critics’ conclusion that addiction is not a medical disorder but is rather a matter of problematic nondisordered choice does not follow. This is because there is a further possible account of addiction, the evolutionary “hijack” view, that holds that addiction is due to the availability of substances and stimuli that were unavailable during human species evolution and that coopt certain brain areas concerned with human motivation, creating biologically undesigned peremptory desires. I argue that if the hijack theory is correct, then it opens up the possibility that addiction could be a true motivational medical disorder for which there is no underlying neurological-level dysfunction. Finally, I explore the implications of this account for how we see the social responsibility for addiction and how we attempt to control it.
KW - Addiction
KW - Brain disorder
KW - Diagnosis
KW - Harmful dysfunction
KW - Intentionality
KW - Philosophy of psychiatry
KW - Substance use disorder
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85085518763&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85085518763&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.bbr.2020.112665
DO - 10.1016/j.bbr.2020.112665
M3 - Review article
C2 - 32348870
AN - SCOPUS:85085518763
SN - 0166-4328
VL - 389
JO - Behavioural Brain Research
JF - Behavioural Brain Research
M1 - 112665
ER -