TY - JOUR
T1 - Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games
T2 - An experimental approach
AU - Schotter, Andrew
AU - Sopher, Barry
N1 - Funding Information:
The financial support of the Russell Sage Foundation and the C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University is also gratefully acknowledged. The authors would like to thank Drew Fudenberg for his valuable comments and the time he took to make them and the comments of two anonymous referees. We would also like to thank Sangeeta Pratap, Mikhael Shor and Judy Goldberg for their valuable research assistance, and Yevgeniy Tovshteyn for writing the program upon which the experiments were run.
PY - 2007/2
Y1 - 2007/2
N2 - In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior in Ultimatum games. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers.
AB - In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior in Ultimatum games. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.005
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33751539865
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 58
SP - 365
EP - 393
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -