ALMOST: Adversarial Learning to Mitigate Oracle-less ML Attacks via Synthesis Tuning

Animesh B. Chowdhury, Lilas Alrahis, Luca Collini, Johann Knechtel, Ramesh Karri, Siddharth Garg, Ozgur Sinanoglu, Benjamin Tan

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Oracle-less machine learning (ML) attacks have broken various logic locking schemes. Regular synthesis, which is tailored for area-power-delay optimization, yields netlists where key-gate localities are vulnerable to learning. Thus, we call for security-aware logic synthesis. We propose ALMOST, a framework for adversarial learning to mitigate oracle-less ML attacks via synthesis tuning. ALMOST uses a simulated-annealing-based synthesis recipe generator, employing adversarially trained models that can predict state-of-the-art attacks' accuracies over wide ranges of recipes and key-gate localities. Experiments on ISCAS benchmarks confirm the attacks' accuracies drops to around 50% for ALMOST-synthesized circuits, all while not undermining design optimization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2023 60th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, DAC 2023
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Electronic)9798350323481
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023
Event60th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, DAC 2023 - San Francisco, United States
Duration: Jul 9 2023Jul 13 2023

Publication series

NameProceedings - Design Automation Conference
Volume2023-July
ISSN (Print)0738-100X

Conference

Conference60th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, DAC 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Francisco
Period7/9/237/13/23

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation

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