An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium

Ariel Rubinstein; Kemal Yıldız

doi:10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2

An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium

Ariel Rubinstein, Kemal Yıldız

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We analyse the object assignment model enriched with a set of orderings over the set of agents. These orderings provide potential criteria for determining the suitability of agents to be assigned to an object. A candidate for a definable equilibrium is an assignment of the agents to the objects and an attachment of a single criterion to each object. In equilibrium, each agent is better-suited to his assigned object than any agent who envies him, according to the criterion attached to that object. We analyze the equilibrium notion and provide some examples.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	543-552
Number of pages	10
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	26
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2
State	Published - Dec 2022

Keywords

Definability
Definable equilibrium
Object assignment model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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10.1007/s10058-021-00267-2

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abstract = "We analyse the object assignment model enriched with a set of orderings over the set of agents. These orderings provide potential criteria for determining the suitability of agents to be assigned to an object. A candidate for a definable equilibrium is an assignment of the agents to the objects and an attachment of a single criterion to each object. In equilibrium, each agent is better-suited to his assigned object than any agent who envies him, according to the criterion attached to that object. We analyze the equilibrium notion and provide some examples.",

keywords = "Definability, Definable equilibrium, Object assignment model",

author = "Ariel Rubinstein and Kemal Yıldız",

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N2 - We analyse the object assignment model enriched with a set of orderings over the set of agents. These orderings provide potential criteria for determining the suitability of agents to be assigned to an object. A candidate for a definable equilibrium is an assignment of the agents to the objects and an attachment of a single criterion to each object. In equilibrium, each agent is better-suited to his assigned object than any agent who envies him, according to the criterion attached to that object. We analyze the equilibrium notion and provide some examples.

AB - We analyse the object assignment model enriched with a set of orderings over the set of agents. These orderings provide potential criteria for determining the suitability of agents to be assigned to an object. A candidate for a definable equilibrium is an assignment of the agents to the objects and an attachment of a single criterion to each object. In equilibrium, each agent is better-suited to his assigned object than any agent who envies him, according to the criterion attached to that object. We analyze the equilibrium notion and provide some examples.

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KW - Definable equilibrium

KW - Object assignment model

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An étude in modeling the definability of equilibrium

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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