An axiomatization of plays in repeated games

Laurent Mathevet

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    Suppose that, in repeated games, players eventually engage in a pattern of action profiles, which we call a convention. Do some conventions seem more plausible than others? We answer axiomatically based on the principles of stability and efficient simplicity. The main solution says that conventions should be constant repetitions of a static Nash equilibrium, or such that players switch between two Pareto unranked profiles (across which they each change action). In some repeated games, this reduces the multiplicity of outcomes and even leads to uniqueness. The paper also reports experimental evidence that supports our findings.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)19-31
    Number of pages13
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume110
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 2018

    Keywords

    • Axioms
    • Complexity
    • Conventions
    • Equilibrium selection
    • Evolution
    • Pattern mining
    • Stability

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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