An experimental test of advice and social learning

Boǧaçhan Celen; Shachar Kariv; Andrew Schotter

doi:10.1287/mnsc.1100.1228

An experimental test of advice and social learning

Boǧaçhan Celen, Shachar Kariv, Andrew Schotter

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Social learning describes any situation in which individuals learn by observing the behavior of others. In the real world, however, individuals learn not just by observing the actions of others but also from seeking advice. This paper introduces advice giving into the standard social-learning experiment of Çelen and Kariv (Çelen, B., S. Kariv. 2005. An experimental test of observational learning under imperfect information. Econom. Theory 26 (3) 677-699). The experiments are designed so that both pieces of information-action and advice-are equally informative (in fact, identical) in equilibrium. Despite the informational equivalence of advice and actions, we find that subjects in a laboratory social-learning situation appear to be more willing to follow the advice given to them by their predecessor than to copy their action, and that the presence of advice increases subjects' welfare.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1687-1701
Number of pages	15
Journal	Management Science
Volume	56
Issue number	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1100.1228
State	Published - Oct 2010

Keywords

Experiment
Naï
Social learning
Ve advice
Word-of-mouth learning

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Strategy and Management
Management Science and Operations Research

Access to Document

10.1287/mnsc.1100.1228

Cite this

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An experimental test of advice and social learning

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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