An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game

Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We show that for solvable games, the calculation of the strategies which survive iterative elimination of dominated strategies in normal games is equivalent to the calculation of the backward induction outcome of some extensive game. However, whereas the normal game form does not provide information on how to carry out the elimination, the corresponding extensive game does. As a by-product, we conclude that implementation using a subgame perfect equilibrium of an extensive game with perfect information is equivalent to implementation through a solution concept which we call guided iteratively elimination of dominated strategies which requires a uniform order of elimination. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)32-42
    Number of pages11
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume70
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 1996

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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