Abstract
Microfluidic routing fabrics are reconfigurable primitives that permit the dynamic redirection of fluids on a flow-based microfluidic biochip. Such primitives are bringing the benefits of rapid prototyping and on-the-fly reconfigurability from integrated circuits to the microfluidic domain. An unfortunate side effect of this increased flexibility is susceptibility to tampering. A malicious adversary can alter either the electronic control signals or the pneumatic control lines used to drive the routing fabric. In this paper, we provide a high-level security assessment of microfluidic systems utilizing routing fabrics, and analyze their security under actuation tampering attacks. We show that under reasonable assumptions, the permissible states of a routing fabric form a probability distribution. We provide methods for efficiently determining this distribution through a binary tree representation. We then show how to synthesize routings fabrics that exhibit well-defined behaviors. We call a routing fabric designed in such a way tamper-mitigating, as it makes the effects of tampering probabilistically less severe. We then show how the proposed methodology can be used to protect a forensic DNA barcoding application from attack.
Original language | English (US) |
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Article number | 8675297 |
Pages (from-to) | 1003-1016 |
Number of pages | 14 |
Journal | IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2020 |
Keywords
- Flow-based microfluidic biochip
- mitigation
- routing fabric
- security
- tampering
- transposer
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Software
- Computer Graphics and Computer-Aided Design
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering