ASSURE: RTL Locking Against an Untrusted Foundry

Christian Pilato, Animesh Basak Chowdhury, Donatella Sciuto, Siddharth Garg, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Semiconductor design companies are integrating proprietary intellectual property (IP) blocks to build custom integrated circuits (ICs) and fabricate them in a third-party foundry. Unauthorized IC copies cost these companies billions of dollars annually. While several methods have been proposed for hardware IP obfuscation, they operate on the gate-level netlist, i.e., after the synthesis tools embed most of the semantic information into the netlist. We propose ASSURE to protect hardware IP modules operating on the register-transfer level (RTL) description. The RTL approach has three advantages: 1) it allows designers to obfuscate IP cores generated with many different methods (e.g., hardware generators, high-level synthesis tools, and preexisting IPs); 2) it obfuscates the semantics of an IC before logic synthesis; and 3) it does not require modifications to EDA flows. We perform a cost and security assessment of ASSURE against state-of-the-art oracle-less attacks.

Keywords

  • Foundries
  • Hardware
  • Integrated circuits
  • IP protection
  • Logic gates
  • logic locking
  • register-transfer level (RTL)
  • Security
  • Semantics
  • Tools
  • untrusted foundry.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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