@article{e18a3e1593324f06ab462dfe9c1a2094,
title = "Attention in games: An experimental study",
abstract = "A common assumption in game theory is that players concentrate on one game at a time. However, in everyday life, we play many games and make many decisions at the same time and have to decide how best to divide our limited attention across these settings. In this paper we ask how players solve this attention-allocation problem. We find that players{\textquoteright} attention is attracted to particular features of the games they play and how much attention a subject gives to a given game depends on the other game that the person is simultaneously attending to.",
keywords = "Attention allocation, Bounded rationality, Inattention, Interrelated games",
author = "Ala Avoyan and Andrew Schotter",
note = "Funding Information: We would like to thank Andrew Caplin, Guillaume Fr{\'e}chette, Xavier Gabaix, Ariel Rubinstein, Larbi Alaoui, Miguel A. Ballester, Mark Dean, David Laibson, Keith O'Hara, Antonio Penta, Giovanni Ponti, David Rand and Jakub Steiner for their helpful comments. This paper also benefited from comments received by conference participants at the “Typologies of Boundedly Rational Agents: Experimental Approach,” Jerusalem, June 2015, the 2015 ESA North American meeting, the Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, and the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) Conference. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation, grant number SES-1724550, and also the assistance of the the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University (CESS) and software assistance from Anwar Ruff. Funding Information: We would like to thank Andrew Caplin, Guillaume Fr{\'e}chette, Xavier Gabaix, Ariel Rubinstein, Larbi Alaoui, Miguel A. Ballester, Mark Dean, David Laibson, Keith O{\textquoteright}Hara, Antonio Penta, Giovanni Ponti, David Rand and Jakub Steiner for their helpful comments. This paper also benefited from comments received by conference participants at the “Typologies of Boundedly Rational Agents: Experimental Approach,” Jerusalem, June 2015, the 2015 ESA North American meeting, the Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, and the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE) Conference. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation, grant number SES-1724550, and also the assistance of the the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University (CESS) and software assistance from Anwar Ruff. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2020",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103410",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "124",
journal = "European Economic Review",
issn = "0014-2921",
publisher = "Elsevier",
}