Bargaining and the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic game

Jess Benhabib, Giovanni Ferri

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    An example of a dynamic game between a union and a firm is constructed in which an equilibrium path starts out with non-cooperative strategies and switches to cooperative strategies as the level of employment increases.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)107-111
    Number of pages5
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume24
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1987

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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