Abstract
A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 783-813 |
Number of pages | 31 |
Journal | Journal of Conflict Resolution |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 6 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2004 |
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Conflict
- Military
- Random-walk model
- Warfare
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Business, Management and Accounting
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations