Bargaining and the nature of war

Alastair Smith, Allan C. Stam

    Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

    Abstract

    A model of bargaining embedded within a random-walk model of warfare is developed. The conflict model contains aspects of both lottery-based and war-of-attrition models of conflict. Results show that future disputes are less likely to lead to armed conflict following long rather than short wars. Furthermore, should a subsequent dispute lead to armed conflict, the higher the cost and the longer the previous war, the shorter the conflict is likely to last.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)783-813
    Number of pages31
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
    Volume48
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 2004

    Keywords

    • Bargaining
    • Conflict
    • Military
    • Random-walk model
    • Warfare

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

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