Abstract
We study an alternating offers bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time in a non-stationary, but smooth manner. In general, there exists a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. However, we show that in the limit as the time interval between two consecutive offers becomes arbitrarily small, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, we derive a powerful characterization of the unique (limiting) subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the circumstances under which Nash's bargaining solution implements this bargaining equilibrium. Finally, we extend our results to the case when the players have time-varying inside options.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 70-89 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 109 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 1 2003 |
Keywords
- Alternating offers
- Non-stationary environment
- Subgame perfect equilibrium
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics