Abstract
We extend the standard model of social learning in two ways. First, we introduce a social network and assume that agents can only observe the actions of agents to whom they are connected by this network. Secondly, we allow agents to choose a different action at each date. If the network satisfies a connectedness assumption, the initial diversity resulting from diverse private information is eventually replaced by uniformity of actions, though not necessarily of beliefs, in finite time with probability one. We look at particular networks to illustrate the impact of network architecture on speed of convergence and the optimality of absorbing states. Convergence is remarkably rapid, so that asymptotic results are a good approximation even in the medium run.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 329-346 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 45 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Nov 2003 |
Keywords
- Herd behavior
- Informational cascades
- Networks
- Social learning
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics