Behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers

Guillaume Fréchette, John H. Kagel, Massimo Morelli

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    Alternating-offer and demand bargaining models of legislative bargaining make very different predictions in terms of both ex ante and ex post distribution of payoffs, as well as in the role of the order of play. The experiment shows that actual bargaining behavior is not as sensitive to the different bargaining rules as the theoretical point predictions, whereas the comparative statics are in line with both models. We compare our results to studies that attempt to distinguish between these two approaches using field data, finding strong similarities between the laboratory and field data regardless of the underlying bargaining process.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1893-1937
    Number of pages45
    JournalEconometrica
    Volume73
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Nov 2005

    Keywords

    • Alternating offer
    • Behavioral identification
    • Demand bargaining
    • Legislative bargaining

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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