Abstract
In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjects' beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subject's true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 449-463 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 75 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 2012 |
Keywords
- Beliefs
- Guessing game
- Level-k theory
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics