Beyond Markov: Accounting for Independence Violations in Causal Reasoning

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Although many theories of causal cognition are based on causal graphical models, a key property of such models-the independence relations stipulated by the Markov condition-is routinely violated by human reasoners. Two accounts of why people violate independence are formalized and subjected to experimental test. Subjects' inferences were more consistent with a dual prototype model in which people favor network states in which variables are all present or all absent than a leaky gate model in which information is transmitted through network nodes when it should normatively be blocked. The article concludes with a call for theories of causal cognition that rest on foundations that are faithful to the kinds of causal inferences people actually draw.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2016
EditorsAnna Papafragou, Daniel Grodner, Daniel Mirman, John C. Trueswell
PublisherThe Cognitive Science Society
Pages1853-1858
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9780991196739
StatePublished - 2016
Event38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Recognizing and Representing Events, CogSci 2016 - Philadelphia, United States
Duration: Aug 10 2016Aug 13 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2016

Conference

Conference38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Recognizing and Representing Events, CogSci 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia
Period8/10/168/13/16

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Cognitive Neuroscience

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