Calibrated Incentive Contracts

Sylvain Chassang

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    This paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability, moral hazard, and adverse selection. The paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based on calibrating the incentive properties of simple benchmark contracts that are attractive but infeasible, due to limited liability constraints. The resulting dynamic contracts are detail-free and satisfy robust performance bounds independently of the underlying process for returns, which need not be i.i.d. or even ergodic.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1935-1971
    Number of pages37
    Issue number5
    StatePublished - Sep 2013


    • Approachability
    • Detail-free contracts
    • Dynamic contracts
    • High-watermark contracts
    • Robust contracts

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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