Abstract
The same high labor supply elasticity that characterizes a representative family model with indivisible labor and employment lotteries also emerges without lotteries when self-insuring individuals choose interior solutions for their career lengths. Off corners, the more elastic is an earnings profile to accumulated working time, the longer is a worker's career. Negative (positive) unanticipated earnings shocks reduce (increase) the career length of a worker holding positive assets, while the effects are the opposite for a worker with negative assets. By inducing a worker to retire at an official retirement age, government provided social security can attenuate responses of career lengths to earnings profile slopes, earnings shocks, and taxes.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1-20 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Review of Economic Dynamics |
Volume | 17 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2014 |
Keywords
- Career length
- Earnings profile
- Earnings shocks
- Indivisible labor
- Labor supply elasticity
- Social security
- Taxes
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics