TY - JOUR
T1 - Characterizations of perfect recall
AU - Alós-Ferrer, Carlos
AU - Ritzberger, Klaus
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Bernhard von Stengel, an associate editor, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments which helped improve the paper. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Projects Al-1169/1 and I 1242-G16, respectively.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2016, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
PY - 2017/5/1
Y1 - 2017/5/1
N2 - This paper considers the condition of perfect recall for the class of arbitrarily large discrete extensive form games. The known definitions of perfect recall are shown to be equivalent even beyond finite games. Further, a qualitatively new characterization in terms of choices is obtained. In particular, an extensive form game satisfies perfect recall if and only if the set of choices, viewed as sets of ultimate outcomes, fulfill the “Trivial Intersection” property, that is, any two choices with nonempty intersection are ordered by set inclusion.
AB - This paper considers the condition of perfect recall for the class of arbitrarily large discrete extensive form games. The known definitions of perfect recall are shown to be equivalent even beyond finite games. Further, a qualitatively new characterization in terms of choices is obtained. In particular, an extensive form game satisfies perfect recall if and only if the set of choices, viewed as sets of ultimate outcomes, fulfill the “Trivial Intersection” property, that is, any two choices with nonempty intersection are ordered by set inclusion.
KW - Large extensive form games
KW - Non-cooperative games
KW - Perfect recall
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84969776620&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84969776620&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s00182-016-0534-x
DO - 10.1007/s00182-016-0534-x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84969776620
SN - 0020-7276
VL - 46
SP - 311
EP - 326
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
IS - 2
ER -