Characterizations of perfect recall

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper considers the condition of perfect recall for the class of arbitrarily large discrete extensive form games. The known definitions of perfect recall are shown to be equivalent even beyond finite games. Further, a qualitatively new characterization in terms of choices is obtained. In particular, an extensive form game satisfies perfect recall if and only if the set of choices, viewed as sets of ultimate outcomes, fulfill the “Trivial Intersection” property, that is, any two choices with nonempty intersection are ordered by set inclusion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)311-326
Number of pages16
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume46
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2017

Keywords

  • Large extensive form games
  • Non-cooperative games
  • Perfect recall

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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