Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result

Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form games? To answer this question, this paper provides conditions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any well-behaved perfect information game defined on a large game tree. In particular, the set of plays needs to be endowed with a topology satisfying two conditions. (a) Nodes are closed as sets of plays; and (b) the immediate predecessor function is an open map.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)407-430
Number of pages24
JournalEconomic Theory
Volume63
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2017

Keywords

  • Backwards induction
  • Equilibrium existence
  • Large extensive form games
  • Perfect information
  • Subgame perfection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this