@article{bf5bb562e2864197a0a5a80ea1eafebd,
title = "Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result",
abstract = "What is the minimal structure that is needed to perform equilibrium analysis in large extensive form games? To answer this question, this paper provides conditions that are simultaneously necessary and sufficient for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in any well-behaved perfect information game defined on a large game tree. In particular, the set of plays needs to be endowed with a topology satisfying two conditions. (a) Nodes are closed as sets of plays; and (b) the immediate predecessor function is an open map.",
keywords = "Backwards induction, Equilibrium existence, Large extensive form games, Perfect information, Subgame perfection",
author = "Carlos Al{\'o}s-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger",
note = "Funding Information: The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions by two anonymous referees, Larry Blume, Egbert Dierker, Michael Greinecker, Josef Hofbauer, Johannes Kern, Martin Meier, Karl Schlag, Satoru Takahashi, and Walter Trockel, by seminar participants at Cornell, Princeton, and Yale University, and at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, by participants in a semi-plenary session at the World Congress of the Game Theory Society 2012, and by participants at the Workshop in honor of Harold Kuhn in Vienna 2012. We also thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) for financial support under Projects Al1169/1 and I338-G16, respectively. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.",
year = "2017",
month = feb,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1007/s00199-015-0937-0",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "63",
pages = "407--430",
journal = "Economic Theory",
issn = "0938-2259",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "2",
}