TY - GEN
T1 - Clinical computer security for victims of intimate partner violence
AU - Havron, Sam
AU - Freed, Diana
AU - Chatterjee, Rahul
AU - McCoy, Damon
AU - Dell, Nicola
AU - Ristenpart, Thomas
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to sincerely thank all our study participants, the Family Justice Centers, and the NYC ENDGBV. This work was funded by the NSF through grants CNS-1717062 and CNS-1558500, and by gifts from Comcast and Google.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 by The USENIX Association. All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - Digital insecurity in the face of targeted, persistent attacks increasingly leaves victims in debilitating or even life-threatening situations. We propose an approach to helping victims, what we call clinical computer security, and explore it in the context of intimate partner violence (IPV). IPV is widespread and abusers exploit technology to track, harass, intimidate, and otherwise harm their victims. We report on the iterative design, refinement, and deployment of a consultation service that we created to help IPV victims obtain in-person security help from a trained technologist. To do so we created and tested a range of new technical and non-technical tools that systematize the discovery and investigation of the complicated, multimodal digital attacks seen in IPV. An initial field study with 44 IPV survivors showed how our procedures and tools help victims discover account compromise, exploitable misconfigurations, and potential spyware.
AB - Digital insecurity in the face of targeted, persistent attacks increasingly leaves victims in debilitating or even life-threatening situations. We propose an approach to helping victims, what we call clinical computer security, and explore it in the context of intimate partner violence (IPV). IPV is widespread and abusers exploit technology to track, harass, intimidate, and otherwise harm their victims. We report on the iterative design, refinement, and deployment of a consultation service that we created to help IPV victims obtain in-person security help from a trained technologist. To do so we created and tested a range of new technical and non-technical tools that systematize the discovery and investigation of the complicated, multimodal digital attacks seen in IPV. An initial field study with 44 IPV survivors showed how our procedures and tools help victims discover account compromise, exploitable misconfigurations, and potential spyware.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85075063992&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85075063992&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
T3 - Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium
SP - 105
EP - 122
BT - Proceedings of the 28th USENIX Security Symposium
PB - USENIX Association
T2 - 28th USENIX Security Symposium
Y2 - 14 August 2019 through 16 August 2019
ER -